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Staff Recent Interpretation Ratified:
Coopers & Lybrand of Australia

This interpretation was ratified by
the ISB at its November 3, 1998
meeting

July 22,1998
Time-Limited
Confidentiality
Granted
(Subsequently
released)
David E. Birenbaum, Esq.
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson
1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Suite 800
Washington, DC 20004-2505
Dear Mr. Birenbaum:
This letter is to confirm to you, for your client Coopers & Lybrand
Australia (and its successor firm PricewaterhouseCoopers Australia),
the conclusions reached during the June 23 telephone conference call
with the ISB staff, the SEC staff and your firm with regard to the share
registry service independence issues described primarily in your
memorandum dated May 21, 1998.
Your memorandum describes a likely unique set of facts in which
Coopers & Lybrand Australia, through a now separate but affiliated
entity, has for one or two years performed certain share registry
services for Telstra Corporation Limited and certain related entities,
which have not been audit clients. However, during July 1998,
Coopers & Lybrand Australia is expected to form
PricewaterhouseCoopers Australia by merging with Price Waterhouse
of Australia, which under contract from and in coordination with the
Auditor General of Australia, is the auditor of Telstra in connection
with its U.S. SEC registrant status.
The Coopers & Lybrand Australia share registry services, while stated
in your memorandum to be acceptable under Australian independence
standards, normally would cause an impairment of independence with
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regard to an audit client that is a U.S. SEC registrant, as you are aware
from your reference to the SEC staff’s 1993 Western Mining
correspondence. You believe, however, that in the Telstra case there
exist a number of mitigating and other circumstances, some involving
potential significant hardship to Telstra, which warrant a different,
transition period, approach. Specifically, you have proposed that your
client and the merged firm in these circumstances be deemed not to
have impaired their independence with respect to the Telstra audit until
June 30, 1999, with the expectation that the independence concern
would be eliminated by the sale of the services entity before that date.
The ISB staff has addressed this issue from two viewpoints: first,
whether there is sufficient support for some type of transitional
approach and if so, then, how long a transition period would be
appropriate in these circumstances.
When considering whether a transitional approach is appropriate, the
ISB staff believes that several conceptual threats arise with respect to
the performance of the share registry services when the same firm is
auditing Telstra’s financial statements. That is, a reasonable investor
might consider the firm, to a degree, to be auditing its own work, or to
be acting as management or in the role of an employee, or creating a
mutuality of interest with the client.
However, you have represented that several mitigating factors exist in
these circumstances to significantly counter those threats. For
example:
 The Telstra audit is performed by personnel from Price Waterhouse
of Australia, rather than from Coopers & Lybrand Australia – and
even with respect to Coopers & Lybrand Australia the share
registry services have been moved into a separate entity;
 No Price Waterhouse Australia personnel have any financial
interest in that separate entity before or after the merger;
 Especially because of the aggregate sale of shares through the use
of traded instalment receipts, the share registry services in question
have no direct effect on the financial statements under audit; and
 The Auditor General of Australia is heavily involved in the Telstra
audit, particularly including as to areas relating to the share registry
services. In addition, as to registration services for TIRT (the
Telstra Instalment Receipt Trustee Limited), a new Clearing House
Electronic Sub-Register System (“CHESS Sub-Register”) for the
market trades of the Australian Stock Exchange automatically
communicates virtually all of TIRT’s transfer information, and that
CHESS Sub-Register is reviewed by a different major auditing
firm. Further, the Bank of New York, not Coopers & Lybrand
Australia, serves as Telstra’s transfer agent with respect to the
ADRs traded on the New York Stock Exchange.
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In addition, we note that in certain circumstances – e.g., the Western
Mining case referred to in your memorandum - the SEC staff
previously has granted limited relief relating to Australian share
registry services. We also note that Regulation S-X, Rule 2-01 (c)
provides that in considering independence matters “the Commission
will give appropriate consideration to all relevant circumstances,” and
that elsewhere in the SEC literature there is provision allowing auditors
to provide certain otherwise problematic services on a temporary or
emergency basis, and this limited transition situation is temporary.
Considering the above mitigating circumstances and precedent, the ISB
staff concludes that there is sufficient support in these circumstances
for the implementation of a transition period approach.
As to the appropriate length of the transition period, as we discussed
with you on June 23, the ISB staff does not agree that the firm should
be considered independent throughout Telstra’s entire fiscal year ended
June 30, 1999, as you requested. Instead, we believe that, in these facts
and circumstances and as to this matter only, the merged firm,
continuing through a related entity to provide the services in question,
should be considered independent after July 1, 1998 for a limited
transitional period, but only up until the date it starts substantive
“interim” work procedures (e.g., internal controls testing) for that fiscal
year June 30, 1999 audit, which you indicated likely would be in March
or April of 1999. As you described in your memorandum, the firm
expects to resolve this independence concern prior to that date through
appropriately disposing of the entity providing those services. Further,
until the independence concern is resolved, the previously described
separation of the services entity, and of (former) Coopers & Lybrand
Australia personnel from the (former) Price Waterhouse Australia audit
should be enforced.
Several other factors you have presented, and upon which
representations we rely in forming our conclusions, were helpful as
follows:
 This independence concern arises in July 1998 solely due to
completion of the merger – no services causing impairment were
knowingly undertaken. In addition, once identified, even before
completion of the merger the firm has taken responsible and prompt
action (i.e., to sell the entity providing those services) to eliminate
the concern;
 Resignation of the share registry services engagement does not
appear reasonably practicable in a period shorter than that in which
the firm is expected to sell the entity performing the services (for
reasons expressed in your memorandum); and
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Resignation of the audit engagement in the near future would
appear likely to cause serious disruption to the registrant at times of
important activity (for reasons expressed in your memorandum).

Our analysis also notes that Regulation S-X, Rule 2-01 (b), as to
financial interests, defines in the authoritative literature the relevant
independence period as “during the period of his professional
engagement to examine the financial statements being reported on or at
the date of his report….” While the above described independence
threats conceptually exist from the date of the merger, we believe that
those threats would become significantly stronger when the share
registry services were being performed during the period in which the
completely merged firm was performing substantive audit procedures.
Therefore, in these circumstances, the ISB staff considers it necessary
to require that the transition period threats be negated before the
commencement of substantive (interim) procedures for the June 30,
1999 audit, scheduled to start in March or April 1999.
The above ISB staff conclusions relate solely to the specific facts and
circumstances of this highly unusual situation; different facts may lead
to different conclusions, and our conclusions rely upon the
representations you have made to us.
 In addition, the ISB staff does not necessarily agree with all
arguments made in your correspondence – in particular (but not
only) your statement in item 8.1 of your May 21 memo that “Until
the Share Transfer in early December 1998, the SRS Entity will
provide registry services primarily to TIRT and the ESOP Trustee,
and these services will not impair the Merged Firm’s independence
in relation to Telstra.”
 Further, as agreed, this response to your issue addresses only the
situation in which the sale of the share registry services entity is
made to an independent party and involves no earnout, guarantee of
future revenue, or similar contingency. Any such contingencies
introduced into the sale would be new facts to be separately
evaluated; as we discussed, the ISB staff has significant
reservations with regard to the effectiveness of a “sale” as a
resolution to an underlying independence concern when such
contingencies are present.
As we discussed in our June 23 conference call that included the SEC
staff, we confirm our understanding that under the SEC’s Financial
Reporting Release 50 and the ISB’s Operating Policies, the conclusions
stated in this letter may be relied upon, as to this case, only by the
parties directly affected by them. You listed the following as expected
affected parties: Coopers & Lybrand Australia, Price Waterhouse of
Australia, TIRT, the ESOP Trustee, Telstra, and the Commonwealth of
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Australia. We presume that PricewaterhouseCoopers Australia also
soon should be viewed as an affected party.
Please notify us upon the occurrence of the first of any of the
determinative events referred to above (such as the sale of the share
registry services entity), or of any other relevant and important matters
(such as the public announcement of the intent to sell the share registry
services entity as described in our agreement to time-limited
confidentiality). Also, please remember that this interpretive letter, and
the memoranda you have submitted to us on this matter, will be subject
to being made public in accordance with ISB policies and practices at
the end of the agreed-upon limited confidentiality period.
Sincerely,
Richard H. Towers
Technical Director

May 22, 1998

David E. Birenbaum, Esq.
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson
1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Suite 800
Washington, D.C. 20004-2505

CONFIDENTIAL
(Subsequently
released)

Dear Mr. Birenbaum:
The ISB staff has received your Request for Interpretation/Advice
dated May 21, 1998, on behalf of your client, Coopers & Lybrand of
Australia, and your request for confidential treatment. The ISB staff
agrees to provide confidential treatment as described below.


The private business information and strategies disclosed in your
request provide appropriate basis for limited confidential treatment.



However, that basis substantially expires at the earlier of: the
public announcement by Coopers & Lybrand or certain of its
partners of the intent to sell the share registry services entity, or the
abandonment of C&L efforts to sell that entity accompanied by
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resolution of the independence question in another manner, but in
no case later than July 1, 1999. (Because this business is located in
Australia, we request you to notify us if, and when, such a public
announcement, or an abandonment of such efforts to sell, occur.)


Upon reaching the appropriate date as described directly above, the
ISB staff will deem its grant of confidential treatment to be ended.
Thereafter, the typical information for our formal interpretive
consultations could, and likely would, be made public by the ISB
staff, including on our website. Information subject to being made
public would include our response letter (not yet prepared), your
memo dated May 21, 1998, including attachments (specifically
including certain previous correspondence relating to “Western
Mining”), and any further information you send to us as part of this
consultation.

- As to any such ISB staff publication, we would be willing to
consider, although not committing to accept, any requests you
might make to “redact” any specific numbers or information
that you at that time believe still to be of a confidential nature.


In addition, you have requested that the SEC staff be involved in
the consultations on this issue. Your May 21 memo indicates that
you will arrange confidential treatment of your materials with the
SEC staff and their appropriate access to these materials.

We will proceed with our review of your request and coordinate
comments with the SEC staff, and will contact you as soon as
reasonably possible for additional information or discussions to lead to
a resolution.
Sincerely,
Richard H. Towers
Technical Director
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Index to Public File Contents of Requester Documents
Relating to ISB Staff Interpretive Letter Dated 7/22/98
Letters/ Memos of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver, & Jacobson
1. 5/8/98 (7 p.) – partly amended by 5/21/98 memo
(- 1 p. transmittal memo – hardcopy file only)
2. 5/21/98 (26p.)
(- 40 p. Appendices A-B-C-D [less A4-redacted] – hardcopy
file only)
(- 1 p. transmitted memo – hardcopy file only)
3. 6/8/98 (3 p.)
4. (-1 p. 7/22/98 – hardcopy file only)
5. 9/10/98 (1 p.)
Note: Two “hardcopy files” are maintained, one at the ISB offices in
New York City, and one at the AICPA Library, Harborside Financial
Center, 201 Plaza Three, Jersey City, New Jersey. Copies of the
hardcopy file documents may be obtained upon request at a cost of $
.15 per page.

FRIED, FRANK, HARRIS, SHRIVER & JACOBSON
A PARTNERSHIP INCLUDING PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS
1001 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W., SUITE 800
WASHINGTON, DC 20004 - 2505
202 - 639 -7000
FAX - 202 - 639 - 7008

September 10, 1998
Writer’s Direct Line
202-639-7019

By Facsimile and U.S. Mail
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Richard H. Towers
Technical Director
Independence Standards Board
1211 Avenue of the Americas
6th Floor
New York, New York 10036-8775
Dear Rick:
We wish to inform you that PricewaterhouseCoopers ("PwC")
in Australia has completed the sale of its share registry services entity
to an independent party. The sale does not involve any “earn-out,”
guarantee of future revenue by PwC or other such contingency.
Prior to the publication of your interpretive letter and our
submissions to the Independence Standards Board regarding Coopers &
Lybrand's share registry business in Australia, we would like to redact
certain privileged or confidential information from the submissions.
Please contact us at your earliest convenience to discuss this matter.
Sincerely,
David E. Birenbuam

deb:paj:141045

NEW YORK - WASHINGTON - LOS ANGELES - LONDON

June 8, 1998
WRITER’S DIRECT LINE
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202-639-7019
CONFIDENTIAL
BY FACSIMILE
Richard H. Towers
Technical Director
Independence Standards Board
1211 Avenue of the Americas
6th Floor
New York, New York 10036-8775
Dear Rick:
This letter contains responses to questions you have raised
subsequent to our submission of a request for interpretive guidance on
behalf of our client, Coopers & Lybrand of Australia (“C&L
Australia”).
1. Telstra


Telstra Corporation Limited currently is the largest
corporation in Australia.

(Redacted)
2. Dividend Payments


C&L Australia does not exercise custody over Telstra's
assets in connection with dividend payments.
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3. Telstra Audit Plan


For the year ending June 30, 1999, the audit plan for the
Telstra audit is as follows:
November 1998

Completion of audit plan

March – April 1999

Internal controls testing
(review of key control
systems; detailed testing of
transactions that generate
entries to Telstra’s ledgers)

June 1999

Pre-final audit

Mid-July – August 1999

Final audit



In addition to these dates, Price Waterhouse of Australia
will conduct a half-year review for Australian purposes
during mid-January and February 1999.



If the Commonwealth of Australia conducts a further
privatization of Telstra, additional audit work will be
required.

4. Computershare


Computershare is independent of C&L Australia.

5. Sale of the Share Registry Practice


The sale of the share registry practice could involve either
of two contingencies, although the likelihood of a
contingency has not yet been determined.



First, the purchaser may require a guarantee that the share
registry practice will not suffer a significant decline in the
year following the sale. Second, the parties may wish to
structure a portion of the payment as an “earn-out,” under
which C&L Australia would be entitled to a share of the
profits of the share registry practice for a number of years
following the sale.



With respect to the first potential contingency, the share
registry practice’s most significant client, Telstra, likely
would provide the purchaser with a comfort letter as to its
10

commitment as a client. Such a letter should obviate the
need for a guarantee.


With respect to the earn-out, none is currently planned, and
we propose that the request for interpretive guidance be
considered on that basis. Should circumstances change in
this respect, C&L Australia will undertake to inform the ISB
and seek concurrence that the specific payment arrangement
would not impair independence.

6. Effect of Sale on Proposed Merger


The proposed sale of the share registry practice will not
have any effect on the terms of the proposed merger of the
Australian Price Waterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand firms.
The terms do not reflect any assumptions as to the goingconcern value of that practice.

Please contact us if you have any further questions.
Sincerely,

David E. Birenbaum

DC02:134579

May 21, 1998
(Appendices not included herein)

202-639-7019
CONFIDENTIAL
BY HAND
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Mr. Richard H. Towers
Technical Director
Independence Standards Board
1211 Avenue of the Americas
6th Floor
New York, New York 10036-8775
Dear Mr. Towers:
This letter confirms and supplements the information presented
in the Request For Interpretation/Advice (the “Request”) submitted on
behalf of our client, Coopers & Lybrand of Australia (“C&L
Australia”), on May 8, 1998 and at our meeting of May 13, 1998. As
noted in the Request, C&L Australia has concluded that the continued
provision of certain share registry services by a partnership owned by
partners of C&L Australia (the “SRS Entity”) to Telstra Corporation
Limited (“Telstra”), for a limited and reasonable time not to extend
beyond Telstra’s fiscal year-end on June 30, 1999, would not impair the
independence of Telstra’s auditor in the United States, Price
Waterhouse of Australia (“PW Australia”), were PW Australia to
merge with C&L Australia. PW Australia has reviewed this matter and
concurs with C&L Australia’s conclusion.
We request your
confirmation that, under the facts and circumstances detailed below, the
merged firm of C&L Australia and PW Australia (the “Merged Firm”),
should it be established, would be independent with respect to audit
work performed subsequent to the merger relating to financial
statements included in registration statements, forms and reports filed
by Telstra with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC” or
“Commission”) under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et
seq. (the “Securities Act”) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (the “Exchange Act”). The basis for C&L
Australia’s conclusion is set forth below.
1.

Introduction and Executive Summary
1.1

The potential independence issue which is addressed
herein arises out of the proposed merger of the member
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firms of the Coopers & Lybrand and Price Waterhouse
worldwide organizations, including C&L Australia and
PW Australia (the “Merger”). If the Merger is approved
by government regulators and, subsequently, by the
various member firms of the two organizations, it will
likely take place in July 1998 (the “Merger Date”).
1.2

Telstra is an Australian telecommunications company
registered with the SEC and two-thirds owned by the
Commonwealth of Australia (the “Commonwealth”).
C&L Australia is providing certain share registry
services in Australia to three entities relevant here:
Telstra; Telstra Instalment Receipt Trustee Limited
(“TIRT”), a trustee established by the Commonwealth to
facilitate the partial privatization of Telstra; and Telstra
ESOP Trustee Pty Limited, a trustee established by
Telstra to administer its employee share ownership plan
(the “ESOP Trustee”). The auditor of Telstra, TIRT and
the ESOP Trustee is the Auditor General of the
Commonwealth. PW Australia performs audit services
solely for Telstra under contract with the Auditor
General and serves as Telstra’s auditor in connection
with its filings with the SEC. PW Australia does not
perform audit services for TIRT or the ESOP Trustee
either directly or indirectly under contract with the
Auditor General.

1.3

In the partial privatization of Telstra in November 1997,
the Commonwealth offered one-third of its shares in
Telstra to the public, with payment to be made in two
instalments. The first instalment was payable in
November 1997. The second instalment is payable on
November 17, 1998. Upon payment of the first
instalment, the Commonwealth transferred one-third of
its shares to TIRT, which then issued to share applicants
one Instalment Receipt (“IR”) for each allocated share.
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Each Instalment Receipt represents a beneficial interest
in the underlying share held by TIRT, and Instalment
Receipt holders are entitled to dividend and voting
rights. If the share applicants pay the second instalment
on November 17, 1998, TIRT will transfer the shares to
them. As a practical matter, the transfer of shares to the
Instalment Receipt holders likely will not occur until
early December 1998 (the “Share Transfer”). Further
information regarding these arrangements is set out in
Telstra’s Amendment No. 3 to Form F-1 (filed with the
SEC on November 10, 1997), in particular the sections
entitled “Description of Shares,” “Description of the
Instalment Receipts and Trust Deed” and “Description
of Interim American Depository Receipts and American
Depository Receipts,” as well as the Memorandum of
Understanding among the Commonwealth, Telstra,
TIRT and the ESOP Trustee, which are appended hereto
(Appendixes A1 - 4, respectively).
1.4

The Australian Securities Commission has stated that
the provision of shareholder registry services to audit
clients in Australia does not impair independence. The
SEC Staff, however, required C&L Australia several
years ago to cease providing share registry services
(within a period no shorter than eight months) to an
audit client in Australia, Western Mining Corporation.

1.5

While C&L Australia considers the Telstra situation
clearly distinguishable from Western Mining, the firm is
pursuing a plan to divest its share registry practice to
unrelated third parties within a reasonable period after
the Merger Date and prior to the end of Telstra’s fiscal
year on June 30, 1999. In this regard, C&L Australia
has retained an adviser, prepared an information
memorandum, and initiated contact with a number of
potential purchasers.
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1.6

Telstra, TIRT, the ESOP Trustee and C&L Australia
seek to avoid any precipitous disruption of service in
connection with the divestment, particularly during a
period in which TIRT will transfer shares to the
Instalment Receipt holders and the Commonwealth may
conduct a further offering of Telstra shares (possibly
before the end of 1998). In connection with such an
offering, Telstra would file a Form F-1 or F-2 with the
Commission. Telstra will also file a Form 20-F annual
report with the Commission in September or October
1998 and may conduct a registered debt offering late this
year or early next year.

1.7

C&L Australia believes that a period of 12 months
constitutes a reasonable time frame within which to
divest the share registry practice. The proposed period
of 12 months is reasonable and necessary in light of
(i) the requirements of Telstra and TIRT with respect to
the Share Transfer, and of Telstra with respect to the
prospective further privatization (which would be, by
far, the largest ever in Australia), (ii) the commercial
impracticability (because of the extensive preparation
required to perform these services, including the
implementation of state-of-the-art technology) of
retaining a suitable replacement service provider within
a shorter time frame, if C&L Australia were to resign,
(iii) the time required to accomplish a divestiture,
(iv) the hardship to Telstra that would result if PW
Australia were to resign as auditor in connection with its
filings with the SEC and (v) the numerous safeguards
which mitigate any potential threat to the independence
of the Merged Firm during the period of divestiture.
Finally, a 12-month period is within the range of
transition periods allowed in analogous circumstances
by the SEC and other regulatory agencies.
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2.

Share Registry Services Provided to Telstra, TIRT and the
ESOP Trustee by C&L Australia
2.1

1

It is common practice in Australia for accounting firms
to maintain the records of share ownership of publiclylisted companies. Share registrars in Australia perform
more limited functions than transfer agents in the United
States, which typically sign stock certificates and
dividend checks and exercise control over dividend bank
accounts. Thus, C&L Australia, like other Australian
registrars, maintains a register of shareholder names,
addresses and number of shares owned, attends to
shareholder inquiries, calculates dividend check
amounts, and performs a number of other ministerial
functions, such as providing information to third parties
to facilitate the distribution by such third parties of
written materials and dividends to shareholders.1 C&L
Australia has implemented procedures to ensure that
Telstra exercises managerial responsibility for the
payment of dividends. The client retains responsibility
for its shareholder register as well. C&L Australia has
agreed also to administer any dividend reinvestment
plan or bonus share issue plan approved by Telstra.
However, no such plan presently exists, and Telstra is
not expected to approve any such plan (which requires
authorization of the Parliament) prior to the divestment
of the share registry business. A comprehensive
summary of the share registry services C&L Australia
has agreed to provide to Telstra, TIRT and the ESOP
Trustee is presented in Appendix B.

C&L Australia has contracted with Computershare Pty Ltd
(“Computershare”), a major provider of share registry computer services in
Australia, to perform certain of these services for TIRT, the ESOP Trustee
and Telstra. Computershare operates and maintains the computer system on
which the registers for these entities are maintained. C&L Australia has online access to the Computershare system.

16

3.

2.2

Since 1994 (and subsequent to the issuance of the
Western Mining letter), the Australian Stock Exchange
(“ASX”) has assumed legal responsibility for recording
the holdings of participants in the Clearing House
Electronic Sub-Register System, or “CHESS,” the
ASX’s electronic settlement system. This section of the
register, which is called the “CHESS Sub-Register,” is
deemed by law to be part of the legal and principal
register of the company. Also since 1994, the ASX has
been required to advise share registrars electronically of
all share transfers arising from trades on the ASX.

2.3

The ASX retains independent auditors (KPMG) to
review the reliability and integrity of the CHESS SubRegister and share transfers advised electronically by the
ASX.

2.4

C&L Australia does not provide share registry services
to Telstra in the United States. Rather, these services
are provided by the Bank of New York, Telstra’s U.S.
transfer agent. The Bank of New York maintains a
register of American Depository Receipts (“ADRs”),
which are listed on the New York Stock Exchange.
Telstra shares underlying such ADRs are deposited with
a custodian bank in Australia and transferred, in the
name of the custodian bank, on the share register in
Australia. Telstra shares also were registered and sold
to U.S. investors in the partial privatization and are now
held by U.S. investors. Transfers of such shares
typically take place through CHESS, although offmarket transfers can also occur.

Relevant Independence Principles
3.1

Regulation S-X sets forth the form and content of, and
requirements for, financial statements required to be
filed by public companies with the Commission under
17

various provisions of the federal securities laws.2
Article 2 of Regulation S-X contains certain rules
relating to the “Qualifications and Reports of
Accountants.” Rule 2-01, which is part of Article 2, sets
forth the Commission’s only substantive rule addressing
the independence of public accountants.3 Rule 2-01 was
adopted in 1940, replacing earlier independence
standards that were promulgated under the Securities
Act.4
3.2

Rule 2-01(c) provides that:
In determining whether an
accountant may in fact be not
independent with respect to a
particular person, the Commission
will
give
appropriate
consideration to all relevant
circumstances, including evidence
bearing on all relationships
between the accountant and that
person or any affiliate thereof,
and will not confine itself to the
relationships
existing
in

2

See Rule 1-01(a) of Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-01(a) (1997).

3

See, e.g., Qualifications and Reports of Accountants; Proposed Amendment
of Rules Regarding Independence of Accountants, 47 Fed. Reg. 47,265 (Oct.
25, 1982) (noting proposal by the Commission “to amend its rule regarding
the independence of accountants * * * 2-01”) (emphasis supplied).

4

See Article 14, Rules and Regulations under the Securities Act of 1933,
Federal Trade Commission (July 6, 1933), subsequently adopted as Article
14, Rules, Regulations and Opinions under the Securities Act of 1933,
Securities and Exchange Commission (Apr. 29, 1935). See also Rule 650,
General Rules and Regulations under the Securities Act of 1933 (Jan. 21,
1936).
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connection with the filings of
reports with the Commission.5
The SEC has stated that Rule 2-01(c) is intended to
allow the Commission to take into consideration “the
existence of particular relationships [that] might be
relevant to its determination whether the accountant was
in fact independent.”6 Moreover, the Commission has
stated that “[n]o set of rules or compilation of
representative situations can embrace all the
circumstances which could affect such a determination”7
and that “situations arise which require judgment in
determining whether the Commission’s standards of
independence have been met . . .”8
3.3

More recently, the SEC issued a “Statement of Policy on
the Establishment and Improvement of Standards
Related to Auditor Independence,”9 a portion of which is
described as setting forth the Commission’s
independence standard. The Commission stated that the
basic test for auditor independence is “whether a
reasonable investor, knowing all relevant facts and
circumstances, would perceive an auditor as having
neither mutual nor conflicting interests with its audit

5

17 C.F.R. § 201.2-01(c) (1997).

6

Accounting Series Release (“ASR”) No. 44 [1937-1982 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,062 at 62,134 (May 24, 1943). A former SEC
Chairman has observed that Rule 2-01(c) was intended to underscore that
“independence was a question of fact, to be determined after examining all
the evidence that might bear upon the existence or non-existence of that
fact.” Purcell, “Cooperation Between SEC and Public Accountants,” J. OF
ACCT., 155-56 (August, 1943).

7

Section 602.02a of the Codification, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 93,257 at
62,885.

8

Id.

9

Exchange Act Release No. 39,676 (Feb. 18, 1998).
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client and as exercising objective and impartial
judgment on all issues brought to the auditor’s
attention.”10 The Commission noted further that in
determining whether an auditor is independent, it
“considers all relevant facts and circumstances, and its
consideration is not confined to relationships existing in
connection with the filing of reports with the
Commission.”11
3.4

In addition to Rule 2-01, Section 600 of the Codification
of Financial Reporting Policies and SEC policy
statements, the SEC’s independence requirements are
reflected in no-action letters issued by the OCA. In
several letters, the OCA has stated that, absent an SEC
rule or interpretation to the contrary, it looks to AICPA
standards for guidance.12 Rule 101 of the AICPA’s
Code of Professional Conduct provides that “[a] member
in public practice shall be independent in the
performance of professional services as required by
standards promulgated by bodies designated by [the
AICPA’s Council].”13 Pursuant to Rule 101, the AICPA
has issued a series of interpretations and ethics rulings
on auditor independence.

10

Id.

11

Id. (citing Rule 2-01(c)).

12

See, e.g., Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, SEC No-Action Letter [1982-1983
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77,398 at 78,455 (Jan. 14,
1983).

13

See AICPA Professional Standards, Code of Professional Conduct (“ET”) §
101.01. In addition, the AICPA’s professional standards state that
“[i]ndependent auditors should not only be independent in fact; they should
avoid situations that may lead outsiders to doubt their independence.” See
AICPA Professional Standards, Statements on Auditing Standards (“AU”) §
220.03.
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3.5

While the SEC has declined to adopt rules limiting the
performance of specific types of non-audit services by
accounting firms for audit clients, the Commission has
asserted in other pronouncements that it will not
consider accountants independent, if they assume
managerial or decision-making responsibilities on behalf
of clients while performing non-attest services.
Specifically, while acknowledging that “independent
public accountants often advise management and offer
professional advice on matters dealing with financial
operations,” Section 602.02.c.i of the Codification
provides that “managerial and decision-making
functions are the responsibility of the client and not of
the independent accountant.”14
Section 602.02.c.i
further states that:
Managerial responsibility begins
when the accountant becomes, or
appears to become, so identified
with the client’s management as
to be indistinguishable from it. In
making a determination of
whether
this
degree
of
identification has been reached,
the basic consideration is
whether, to a third party, the
client
appears
to
be
(i) substantially dependent upon
the accountant’s skill and
judgment
in
its
financial
operations, or (ii) reliant only to
the extent of the customary type
of consultation or advice.15

14

7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 73,263 at 62,890.

15

Id.
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This restriction is based on the Commission’s view that
“[i]f the independent accountant were to perform
functions of this nature, he would develop, or appear to
develop, a mutuality of interest with his client which
would differ only in degree, but not in kind, from that of
an employee,” in which case “it may be logically
inferred that the accountant’s professional judgment
toward the particular client might be prejudiced in that
he would, in effect, be auditing the results of his own
work.”16
3.6

4.

In light of the Commission’s concern with “selfreview,” Section 602.02.c.i also sets forth the SEC’s
position that “an accounting firm cannot be deemed
independent with regard to auditing financial statements
of a client if it has participated closely, either manually
or through its computer systems, in maintenance of the
basic accounting records and preparation of the financial
statements, or if the firm performs other accounting
services through which it participates with management
in operational decisions.”17

A Reasonable Transition Period is Required to Divest the
Share Registry Practice
4.1

16

Id.

17

Id.

As noted above in section 1.1, any independence issue
that arises with respect to the SRS Entity’s performance
of share registry services for Telstra will arise solely as a
result of the Merger. In anticipation of the Merger,
C&L Australia has actively developed and pursued a
plan to divest its share registry practice. Divestment,
however, cannot be accomplished immediately as of the

22

Merger Date. A reasonable transition period is required
to avoid serious disruption to Telstra, TIRT and the
ESOP Trustee.
4.2

5.

C&L Australia believes that a period of 12 months
constitutes a reasonable and necessary time frame within
which to accomplish divestiture of the share registry
practice. A number of factors support this view. First,
TIRT, the ESOP Trustee, Telstra and C&L Australia
wish to minimize disruption during a period in which
two major undertakings regarding the registers will be
implemented. Second, resignation from the share
registry engagements or the audit engagement is not
commercially practicable.
Third, a number of
safeguards mitigate substantially whatever perceived
threat to independence may arise from the Merger
during the period of divestiture. Finally, the proposed
12-month period is required by the particular facts and
circumstances of the TIRT, ESOP Trustee and Telstra
engagements and is consistent with guidance provided
by the SEC and its Staff and other regulatory agencies,
which have granted appropriate transitional relief in
analogous situations.

The Need to Avoid Serious Disruption
5.1

C&L Australia’s request for a reasonable transition
period must be viewed in light of the particular facts and
circumstances presented by its engagements with TIRT,
the ESOP Trustee and Telstra. Specifically, TIRT must
transfer shares of Telstra to over 1.5 million Instalment
Receipt holders in early December 1998, following
payment of the second instalment on November 17,
1998. The logistical requirements associated with
assisting TIRT to process these payments and transfer
the shares to the Instalment Receipt holders are of
extraordinary size and complexity. TIRT and C&L
23

Australia have made substantial
preparing for these tasks.

investments

in

5.2

A second major undertaking affecting TIRT, the ESOP
Trustee and Telstra is the Commonwealth’s planned sale
of its remaining holdings in Telstra. The Australian
government has announced that it will sell the final twothirds of its shares in Telstra if it is re-elected in the
election anticipated to occur late in 1998 or early in
1999. Preliminary planning for a second public offering
of Telstra shares currently is underway.

5.3

Preparation for these major undertakings, which has
been substantial, cannot readily be duplicated by an
alternative service provider.
The Commonwealth
tentatively appointed C&L Australia registrar for its sale
of Telstra shares in June 1997, following an exhaustive
tender process commenced two months earlier. Prior to
that time, C&L Australia spent over 12 months
researching and identifying improved technological
methods for handling the Telstra assignment. Although
C&L Australia had administered the registers associated
with the five largest offerings in Australia’s history,
public announcements indicated that the Telstra offering
could be up to ten times larger than any preceding it.
The industry acknowledged that new and innovative
processes, involving state-of-the-art technology, would
be essential to meet the volume and complexity of the
Telstra assignment. After lengthy negotiations, the
Commonwealth in September 1997 officially appointed
C&L Australia registrar for its sale of Telstra shares,
and, in October 1997, the Commonwealth appointed
C&L Australia registrar for a two-year term for the
ongoing TIRT and Telstra registers.

5.4

The Commonwealth’s offering of one-third of its shares
in Telstra in November 1997 was the largest public
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offering in Australia’s history. The offering generated
approximately 1.9 million share applicants, six times
more than any previous offering in Australia.
Implementation of the TIRT register was a substantial
logistical task. (Redacted)
5.5

6.

C&L Australia’s request for a reasonable transition
period is designed to reassure its clients that divestiture
will take place in an orderly process that will not
jeopardize either the planning or implementation of the
Share Transfer or second public offering.

Resignation from the Registry Engagements is Not
Commercially Practicable in a Term Shorter than that
Required for Divestiture
6.1

The SRS Entity’s resignation from the TIRT, ESOP
Trustee and Telstra engagements would impose
significant inconvenience and hardship on its clients.
Given the approaching date of the Share Transfer and
the possibility of a second public offering shortly
thereafter, and considering the knowledge gained to date
by personnel of C&L Australia and the infrastructure
developed (as described above) to meet the requirements
of TIRT, the ESOP Trustee and Telstra, resignation
would seriously jeopardize satisfactory completion of
the Share Transfer and implementation of the second
public offering (if the Commonwealth decides to
proceed with it).

6.2

Moreover, it is highly unlikely that an alternative service
provider could assume the registry engagements in a
time frame shorter than the one C&L Australia proposes
for divestment. Only one other registrar in Australia
currently is large enough to contemplate the second
instalment and second public offering of Telstra shares.
That registrar is preparing for two other large public
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offerings, one involving the demutualization of AMP
Society and the other involving the sale by the New
South Wales Government of all of its shares in TAB
Limited (a state-owned wagering operator). The AMP
Society demutualization will create a register of up to
1.5 million shareholders (equal in size to the present
TIRT register), while the TAB Limited offering is
expected to generate from 500,000 to 1 million
shareholders. Already facing significant challenges to
meet its obligations under existing engagements, this
registrar will not be prepared to replace the SRS Entity
in the short term as registrar for TIRT, the ESOP Trustee
and Telstra. Notably, C&L Australia declined to tender
for the AMP Society demutualization, recognizing that it
did not have sufficient resources to perform both
assignments satisfactorily. Under these circumstances,
transfer of the TIRT, ESOP Trustee and Telstra registers
to a different service provider is not commercially
practicable in the short term. The period realistically
required to replace the SRS Entity as registrar is
explained in section 9.2.
7.

Resignation from the Telstra Audit Would Cause Significant
Hardship to Telstra
7.1

PW is obligated under contract with the Auditor General
to perform audit services for Telstra for the fiscal years
ending June 30, 1998 and June 30, 1999.

7.2

PW’s resignation from the Telstra audit as of the Merger
Date would jeopardize Telstra’s filing of financial
statements in Australia and the United States for the
fiscal year ending June 30, 1998.

7.3

PW’s resignation from the Telstra audit prior to
completion of the June 30, 1999 audit would be
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impractical and highly disruptive to Telstra for the
following reasons:

7.4

8.

7.3.1

Significant physical disruption to multiple
Telstra divisions and senior management
during start up phase of new auditor;

7.3.2

Potential impact on Telstra’s ability to file on a
timely basis six-month and yearly financial
statements in Australia and the United States;

7.3.3

Potential impact on the Commonwealth’s
timetable for conducting second tranche of the
Telstra privatization;

7.3.4

Disruption to other associated audit activities,
including regulatory accounts, Japanese
Securities
Registration,
and
filing
requirements.

The appointment of an additional auditor by Telstra for
U.S. purposes (and retention of PW for Australian
purposes) would be impractical and highly disruptive to
Telstra for the same reasons. The appointment of an
additional auditor also would impose duplicate costs on
Telstra.

No Independence Issue Arises Prior to December 1998, and,
Thereafter, a Number of Safeguards Mitigate Substantially
Any Perceived Threat to Independence During the Period of
Divestiture
8.1

Until the Share Transfer in early December 1998, the
SRS Entity will provide registry services primarily to
TIRT and the ESOP Trustee, and these services will not
impair the Merged Firm’s independence in relation to
Telstra.
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8.1.1

The provision of registry services to TIRT and
the ESOP Trustee will not give rise to any
potential for self-review.
(a)

Neither TIRT nor the ESOP Trustee is an
audit client of PW Australia or C&L
Australia or will be an audit client of the
Merged Firm.
Rather, the Auditor
General serves as the auditor of both
entities. It should be noted in this
connection that the SEC accepts foreign
governmental auditing agencies, such as
the Auditor General, as auditor of
government agencies in connection with
registration statements, forms and reports
filed with the Commission. See, e.g.,
Rule 2-03 of Regulation S-X.

(b)

The financial accounts of TIRT and the
ESOP Trustee will not be consolidated
with those of Telstra.

(c)

The records the SRS Entity will maintain
in relation to registry services provided to
TIRT and the ESOP Trustee:

(d)



do not form the basis for the
preparation or review of accounting
entries or financial records of Telstra,



have no bearing on the financial
statements of Telstra, and



are not accounting records.

PW Australia does not examine any
aspect of the instalment receipt register of
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TIRT in connection with its audit of
Telstra. Nor does PW Australia examine
in that regard TIRT’s or Telstra’s
performance of its responsibilities to
holders of instalment receipts.
8.1.2

The services provided to TIRT and the ESOP
Trustee do not involve the assumption of
managerial responsibilities on behalf of
Telstra.
(a)

TIRT and the ESOP Trustee, entities
separate and distinct from Telstra, are
managed independently of Telstra.
Telstra neither supervises nor controls
TIRT or the ESOP Trustee. The SRS
Entity’s performance of services for
TIRT and the ESOP Trustee, therefore,
will not relieve Telstra of managerial
responsibilities.

(b)

Both TIRT and the ESOP Trustee owe
fiduciary
obligations
to
trust
beneficiaries, not to Telstra. TIRT owes
its fiduciary obligations to Instalment
Receipt holders. The ESOP Trustee
owes its fiduciary obligations to
participants in Telstra’s employee share
ownership plan (prior to the Share
Transfer, to participating employees
holding
instalment
receipts
and,
thereafter, to employee shareholders to
the extent of payment of the second
instalment).
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8.2

The potential independence issue relating to Telstra does
not arise until early December 1998, when TIRT
transfers the Telstra shares to the Instalment Receipt
holders. Maintenance of the Telstra share register will
be merely a formality prior to that time, because the
register will contain only two shareholders:
the
Commonwealth and TIRT. The principal services the
SRS Entity will provide to Telstra before the Share
Transfer relate to the holding of Telstra’s Annual
General Meeting on November 6, 1998. These services,
involving such tasks as the distribution of meeting
notices and collection and counting of ballots, will be
essentially ministerial and unrelated to maintenance of
Telstra’s share register.18 Accordingly, we see no basis
for concluding that the provision of share registry
services by the SRS Entity to Telstra would give rise to
any potential impairment of independence prior to the
Share Transfer.

8.3

18

No partner of the Merged Firm other than present
partners of C&L Australia will derive any financial
benefit from the provision of share registry services to
Telstra. This is because C&L Australia will transfer the
share registry line of business to the SRS Entity prior to
the Merger. The SRS Entity will be owned by the
present partners of C&L Australia. Further, the present
C&L Australia partners will be walled off from any
audit services performed for Telstra. Such services will
be the sole responsibility of the former PW partners.
Thus, the partners who provide audit services to Telstra
will not derive any benefit from the share registry
engagement.

The SRS Entity also will perform certain tasks in relation to the dividend
Telstra will pay in October 1998, principally with respect to the distribution
of the dividend by TIRT to the Instalment Receipt holders.
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8.4

Based upon current processing volumes for TIRT, the
SRS Entity is expected to perform data entry for Telstra
with respect to only 0.3% of the changes in volume on
the Telstra share register. These changes in volume
reflect share transfers not executed on the ASX. Share
transfers executed on the ASX, which are expected to
account for 99.7% of the changes in volume on the
Telstra register, will be advised electronically to the SRS
Entity.

8.5

The audit team (i.e., the former PW personnel) will rely
on the opinion of the Auditor General, which in turn
relies on the opinion of KPMG, an unrelated third-party
auditor, with respect to share transfers advised
electronically to the SRS Entity. Furthermore, the
Auditor General, not the Merged Firm, retains final
authority over the audit of Telstra’s financial statements.

8.6

The Merged Firm intends to place reliance on the
independent audit work of the Auditor General with
respect to the audit of Telstra’s U.S. financial
statements. Under Australian Corporation Law, the
Auditor General as part of its audit must consider
whether Telstra has kept proper accounting records
(including registers). In satisfying this requirement and
forming an audit opinion on the financial statements, the
Auditor General will perform the following tasks:
8.6.1

Until the time the second instalment is paid,
the Auditor General will review the share
register maintained by Telstra’s Company
Secretary, which includes only two
shareholders (the Commonwealth and TIRT).

8.6.2

Subsequent to instalment receipt conversion,
the Auditor General will adopt the following
procedures for the December 31, 1998 half31

year review/audit and June 30, 1999 annual
audit:
(a)

request confirmation from the share
registrar of the total issued shares and
their paid-up value on the share register;

(b)

request confirmation from the share
registrar that the register has been
properly maintained in accordance with
the Corporation Law; and

(c)

audit the confirmations received under (a)
and (b) above via the conduct of
independent audit testing on the share
register. It is important to note that the
Auditor General will conduct this
independent audit testing directly using
his staff and not rely on sub-contracted
staff from the Merged Firm.

8.7

The Merged Firm’s reliance on the independent audit
work of the Auditor General will accord with the
practice and procedures outlined under U.S. Generally
Accepted Auditing Standards (“GAAS”), in particular
Statement of Auditing Standard 65, “The Auditor’s
Consideration of the Internal Audit Function in an Audit
of Financial Statements.” The Merged Firm will
consider the planning and findings of the work of the
Auditor General in forming an opinion on the U.S.
financial statements.

8.8

The facts and circumstances stated herein distinguish the
present situation from existing SEC and AICPA
guidance relating to share registry services.
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8.8.1

The Telstra situation differs significantly from
Western Mining, where C&L Australia
provided share registry and audit services to
Western Mining Corporation, an SEC
registrant, for a number of years, not as a
consequence of a merger but in the ordinary
course of business, and without the benefit of
the numerous safeguards listed above in
sections 8.3 through 8.7.

8.8.2

Given C&L Australia’s decision to divest the
share registry practice, the present situation
also is distinguishable from Levitz, Zacks &
Ciceric.19 There, the SEC Staff concluded that
an accounting firm’s maintenance of a
database of information on behalf of an audit
client could adversely affect the firm’s
independence, because the arrangement did not
appear to be of a short-term nature.

8.8.3

19

The services the SRS Entity will provide to
Telstra are distinguishable from those
addressed in Example 3 of Section 602.02.c.ii
of the Codification of Financial Reporting
Policies.
(a)

The services do not involve a “complete
restatement” of Telstra’s shareholder
register, as that term is used in Example
3.

(b)

Instead, the services will be ministerial in
nature. Moreover, as indicated above, the
SRS Entity will perform data entry with

SEC No-Action Letter, [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 76,925, at 78,666 (Dec. 17, 1992).
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respect to only a de minimis percentage
(0.3%) of the changes in volume on the
Telstra share register.
(c)

8.8.4

Other share registry services provided to
Telstra, such as the input of data
regarding address changes or the
calculation of dividend check amounts,
similarly will be clerical in nature.

The services do not impair independence under
Interpretation 101-3 of the AICPA’s
independence rules.
(a)

Telstra will remain responsible for all of
its basic accounting records and resulting
financial statements, and no member of
the SRS Entity, or of the Merged Firm,
will exercise influence over Telstra’s
operating, financial, or accounting
policies in connection with the share
registry business.

(b)

Moreover, the SRS Entity will not
consummate transactions in Telstra stock,
possess custody of Telstra assets, or
exercise authority on behalf of Telstra.

(c)

All source documents used in the
compilation of the share registry will be
prepared independently of the SRS
Entity, and the SRS Entity will not make
any changes to the source data without
instruction.
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8.8.5

The services do not impair independence under
AICPA Ethics Ruling 39, which specifically
states that if an auditor is not an “officially
appointed stock transfer agent or registrar,” it
may assist clients in accordance with
Interpretation 101-3.
(a)

8.9

The SRS Entity will not act as an
officially appointed stock transfer agent
or registrar with respect to Telstra’s U.S.
listed securities. Rather, the Bank of
New York, which currently acts as
Telstra’s transfer agent with respect to its
U.S. listed securities, will retain that role.
AICPA Ethics Ruling 39 does not
prohibit the SRS Entity or its employees
(who will not be members of the AICPA)
from serving as an officially appointed
registrar in Australia with respect to
securities not listed on U.S. exchanges.

The services will not impair the appearance of the
Merged Firm’s independence in relation to Telstra The
Commission has stated that the appearance of
independence is to be judged from the perspective of a
reasonable investor, knowing all relevant facts and
circumstances.
We believe that the facts and
circumstances described herein mitigate any perceived
threat to the independence of the Merged Firm, and that
a reasonable investor would not perceive any
impairment. In this regard, we note particularly that the
Australian Securities Commission sanctions the
provision of share registry services to audit clients, and
that the Bank of New York, not the SRS Entity, will
serve as Telstra’s transfer agent with respect to Telstra
securities traded in the United States. In light of these
35

and the other mitigating facts and circumstances
described herein, we believe that a reasonable investor
would perceive the Merged Firm as having neither
mutual nor conflicting interests with Telstra, and as
exercising objective and impartial judgment on all issues
brought to its attention.
9.

The Proposed 12-Month Period Reflects the Particular Facts
and Circumstances Presented Here and is Consistent with
Analogous Guidance
9.1

The proposed 12-month period is necessary to assure
C&L Australia sufficient time to divest the share
registry practice. The primary divestment option is to
conduct a trade sale, in which the share registry practice
would remain intact under new ownership not affiliated
with the Merged Firm. C&L Australia hopes to approve
a trade sale by mid-August 1998.
The second
divestment option, to be pursued if a trade sale is not
achieved, is to conduct a public offering of the share
registry business.
If such an offering becomes
necessary, C&L Australia would expect to conduct it by
mid-April 1999. The proposed divestiture period would
grant C&L Australia an additional ten weeks beyond
mid-April 1999, a modest extension intended to account
for possible delays in the divestiture process A
timetable reflecting these two divestment options is
attached as Appendix C1.

9.2

The timetable outlining the two divestment options
reflects a schedule shorter than the one required to
resign the registry engagements. Specifically, C&L
Australia believes that, while it could notify TIRT, the
ESOP Trustee and Telstra as of the Merger Date of its
intent to resign the share registry engagements, it could
not responsibly resign until mid-May 1999. That is
because any plan of resignation must recognize the
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absence of viable alternative service providers in the
short term, and the clients’ imperative that the Share
Transfer in early December 1998 and a dividend
payment in March or April 1999 not be disrupted. In
this regard, it should be noted that (i) Telstra could face
exposure to substantial liability if the Share Transfer is
not executed properly, (ii) a successful Share Transfer is
in the interests of the Commonwealth, as well as TIRT
and Telstra, and (iii) as noted in section 8.2, the potential
threat to the independence of the Merged Firm does not
arise prior to the Share Transfer. Accordingly, C&L
Australia’s resignation plan provides for finalization of
the resignation process after issues related to the Share
Transfer and dividend payment have been resolved. A
timetable reflecting the resignation option is attached as
Appendix C2.
9.3

The proposed 12-month period is within a range of
transition periods allowed in similar situations by the
SEC and other regulatory agencies.
9.3.1

The Commission’s independence requirements
do not specifically discuss transitional
arrangements designed to address issues that
arise as the result of a merger of two
accounting firms, and no controlling precedent
exists as to what constitutes a reasonable
approach to such issues. However, both Rule
2-01 and other Commission pronouncements
stress the need to consider all the facts and
circumstances bearing on a particular
independence question. In addition, the Office
of the Chief Accountant (“OCA”) has
indicated in a series of no-action letters that it
would not question the independence of an
accounting firm with respect to an audit client
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for which the firm had performed, on a
temporary or emergency basis, certain services
that might otherwise raise independence
concerns.
(a)

For example, in William I. Minoletti &
Co., P.C.,20 the OCA expressed the view
that it would not consider a firm’s
independence impaired where, as a result
of a change in an audit client’s ownership
and location, the firm assisted the client
for a period of approximately one year in
the preparation of monthly financial
statements and the computation of
financial data. An auditor’s preparation
of a client’s financial statements poses a
more obvious independence problem than
does the maintenance of shareholder
registers, which does not involve the
preparation or review of accounting
records.
Nevertheless, the OCA
permitted the firm to prepare its client’s
financial statements for twelve months.

(b)

Similarly, in Adler Blanchard & Co.,21
the OCA indicated that it would not
question the independence of a firm that
provided “limited and mechanical”
bookkeeping services to an audit client
over an eight-month period. The firm
had provided the services as a “temporary

20

SEC No-Action Letter [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶
77,632 at 78,922 (Mar. 27, 1984).

21

SEC No-Action Letter [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 76,929 at 78,669 (Mar. 11, 1991).
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solution” in anticipation of the client’s
establishment
of
an
in-house
bookkeeping function.22
(c)

In a third no-action letter, Stanton,
Magedanz, Edens & Co.,23 the SEC Staff
declined
to
question
a
firm’s
independence where, in response to an
emergency created by the resignation of
an audit client’s chief financial officer
and the illness of an accounting clerk, the
firm assisted the client for a two-month
period in the preparation of monthly
financial statements and performed
additional consulting services.24

22

Id. at 78,670.

23

SEC No-Action Letter [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 78,114 at 76,552 (June 17, 1985).

24

See also Caldwell, Becker, Dervin, Petrick & Co., 1995 SEC No-Act LEXIS
909 (May 10, 1995) (Staff would not question the independence of a firm
that provided general bookkeeping and record keeping services for a twomonth period to an audit client whose bookkeeper had taken a sudden leave
of absence for medical reasons).
While the OCA has indicated in this series of no-action letters that
accounting firms may provide certain otherwise prohibited services on a
temporary basis, it has not defined the parameters of a “temporary” period of
time. In adopting, and then maintaining in place, “temporary rules” under
the federal securities laws in other contexts, however, the Commission has
affirmatively demonstrated that the concept of “temporary” is relative and
flexible. Examples include the “temporary” rules and regulations adopted by
the Commission under the Williams Act in 1968. See EXCHANGE ACT REL.
No. 8370 (July 30, 1968), as amended by EXCHANGE ACT REL. No. 8392
(Aug. 30, 1968), and further amended by EXCHANGE ACT REL. No. 9060
(Jan. 18, 1971). These temporary rules and regulations were not replaced
with “final” rules until 14 years later. See EXCHANGE ACT REL. No. 18524
(March 3, 1982). See also INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT REL. No. 18158
(May 20, 1991) (proposal to rescind two “temporary” rules adopted 11 years
earlier which exempted certain money market funds from registration);
SECURITIES ACT REL. No. 6873 (Aug. 14, 1990) (adoption of two-year
extension of “temporary” rule adopted six years earlier which permitted
various filing fees to be remitted to a U.S. Treasury lockbox located in
Pennsylvania); INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT RULE 3a-2, 17 C.F.R. § 270.3a-
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(d)

In addition, the Codification includes two
examples of circumstances under which
an accounting firm may temporarily
perform
services
considered
inappropriate in other circumstances.
Example 6 under Section 602.02.c.ii of
the Codification states that an accounting
firm’s independence would not be
impaired where the firm assisted an audit
client with its year-end bookkeeping after
the unexpected resignation of the client’s
comptroller, provided that the firm did
not assume managerial responsibilities
for the client.25 Similarly, Example 12
under Section 602.02.g of the
Codification indicates that, in an
emergency or temporary situation, an
accounting firm could rent time on the
firm’s computer to an audit client without
adversely
affecting
the
firm’s
independence.26

(e)

While these examples and no-action
letters do not specifically address
independence issues that arise as a result
of a merger between two accounting
firms, they are consistent with the
Commission’s position, as stated

2 (1998) (exempting “transient” investment companies from the
requirements of the Investment Company Act of 1940 and the rules and
regulations promulgated thereunder for a period of one year).
25

See 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 73,264 at 62,891.

26

See 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 73,272 at 62,906.
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elsewhere in the Codification, that
determinations as to an accountant’s
independence must be made “in the light
of all the pertinent circumstances in the
particular case.” Moreover, these noaction letters broadly illustrate that the
Commission and its Staff have
distinguished between independence
issues that arise in the ordinary course of
an accounting firm’s activities and those
which arise in unusual circumstances,
and they recognize that restrictions which
may normally be considered necessary
are not warranted in extraordinary
circumstances, where independence
policies tailored to the exigencies of the
specific situation are more appropriate.
9.3.2

In assessing the reasonableness of C&L
Australia’s approach to independence issues
arising with respect to Telstra solely as a result
of the Merger, analogies also can be made to
other
situations
involving
business
combinations or other exceptional events in
which courts and regulatory agencies have
recognized that entities may employ
transitional arrangements to address unusual
circumstances, while ensuring compliance with
the fundamental policies underlying applicable
laws and regulations.
Several of these
analogies, drawn principally from other areas
of securities and banking regulation, are
discussed in Appendix D.

9.3.3

In assessing the reasonableness of the
requested period for divestiture, it should be
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noted that, in Western Mining, the SEC Staff
retroactively accepted five years’ worth of
filings made by Western Mining Corporation
while its auditor served (not as a consequence
of a merger but in the ordinary course of
business) as share registrar. In addition, the
SEC Staff granted the auditor a period of at
least eight months to resign the share registry
engagement, which we understand involved a
stable register of only 100,000 shareholders.27
Here, the potential independence issue arises
solely as a result of the anticipated Merger.
Furthermore, the issue centers upon a register
undergoing major changes and containing over
1.5 million Instalment Receipt holders. Under
these circumstances, we believe that a 12month divestiture period is entirely reasonable.
10.

Reliance on Guidance from the ISB Staff
10.1

We understand that parties directly affected by an
interpretation issued by the Staff of the Independence
Standards Board may rely upon the interpretation.

10.2

Financial Reporting Release (“FRR”) No. 50 provides
that, “[p]ositions issued by the ISB staff to a particular
party . . . may be relied upon by that party in accordance
with the ISB Operating Policies.”28

27

The letter summarizing the Staff’s position is dated November 1, 1993. The
Staff required the auditor to resign the share registry engagement “no later
than the time of the commencement of the year-end audit phase for the year
ended June 30 1994.” We understand that the year-end audit phase would
have commenced no sooner than July 1, 1994, thus permitting the auditor at
least eight months to resign the share registry engagement.

28

FRR No. 50, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 72,450 at 62,309 n.11 (Mar. 26,
1998) (emphasis supplied).

42

10.3

The ISB Operating Policies, in turn, provide that,
“[a]bsent express ratification by the Board, ISB staff
interpretations will be considered as applying only to the
particular parties directly affected by the interpretation,
who may rely on such interpretation.”29

10.4

In sum, an ISB Staff interpretation may be relied upon
by the parties directly affected by it. In addition to C&L
Australia, the parties directly affected by the ISB Staff
interpretation in this matter are PW Australia, TIRT, the
ESOP Trustee, Telstra and the Commonwealth. These
parties intend to rely on the Staff’s interpretation.30

29

ISB Operating Policies, Art. 3, § IV (emphasis supplied).

30

FRR No. 50 provides that “[t]he Commission also retains ultimate authority
to not accept, or to modify or supplement, ISB independence standards and
interpretations in the same manner that the Commission can modify or
supplement accounting standards and interpretations issued by the FASB.”
FRR No. 50, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 72,450 at 62,308 (Mar. 26, 1998).
Given the statements in FRR No. 50 and the ISB Operating Policies
regarding reliance on ISB Staff interpretations, we understand that a decision
by the Commission not to accept an interpretation would affect only the
reliance of third parties, not that of the parties directly affected by the
interpretation.
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11.

Conclusion
11.1

C&L Australia has concluded (and PW Australia has
concurred) that the Merged Firm’s independence in
relation to audit work in connection with Telstra’s
financial statements performed before and after the
Merger will not be impaired (i) as a result of the
provision of share registry services by the SRS Entity to
TIRT and the ESOP Trustee, or (ii) as a result of the
provision of share registry services by the SRS Entity to
Telstra prior to the close of its fiscal year ending
June 30, 1999.
In particular, C&L Australia has
concluded (and PW Australia has concurred) that the
Merged Firm’s independence will not be impaired with
respect to registration statements, forms and reports
filed by Telstra with the SEC during this period. We
seek your concurrence with these conclusions and our
understanding of the reliance that may be placed by
parties directly affected by an ISB Staff interpretation
on such interpretation.
Sincerely,

David E. Birenbaum
DC02:131959.08
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DRAFT REQUEST FOR INTERPRETATION / ADVICE
1. Person seeking advice

1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
1.10
1.11

Name of person seeking advice:
Position:
If not partner, was a partner consulted:
Firm/Employer:
Address:
City:
State/Province:
Zip/Postal Code:
Country:
Daytime Phone:
Fax:

Tony Harrington
Deputy Chairman
N/A
Coopers & Lybrand
333 Collins Street
Melbourne
Victoria
3000
Australia
(61 3) 9633-3311
(61 3) 9633-3275

2. Summary description of inquiry

2.1

Would the continued provision of share registry services by Coopers &
Lybrand (“C&L Australia”) to an Australian audit client of Price
Waterhouse (“PW Australia”) for a limited period subsequent to the merger
of the two firms (creating the “Merged Firm”) impair the Merged Firm’s
independence with respect to that client?

3. Facts

3.1

C&L Australia provides certain share registry services in Australia to
Telstra Corporation Limited, an Australian company registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC” or “Commission”) and
owned two-thirds by the Commonwealth of Australia (the
“Commonwealth”). The Commonwealth commenced the privatization of
one-third of Telstra in November, 1997 and may conduct a further offering
of Telstra shares (possibly before the end of the year). In connection with
such an offering, Telstra would file a Form F-1 or F-2 with the
Commission. Telstra will also file a Form 20-F annual report with the
Commission in September or October this year and may conduct a
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registered debt offering late this year or early next year.
3.2

C&L provides certain registry services to Telstra Instalment Receipt
Trustee Limited (“TIRT”), a trustee established by the Commonwealth to
facilitate the partial privatization of Telstra. TIRT presently holds one-third
of Telstra’s shares in trust for holders of Telstra Instalment Receipts, which
are traded on the Australian Stock Exchange (the “ASX”) (American
Depositary Receipts (“ADRs”) are traded on the New York Stock
Exchange). Instalment Receipt holders will make the second of two
scheduled payments for Telstra shares on November 17, 1998. Thereafter,
likely in early December, 1998, TIRT will transfer the Telstra shares to the
Instalment Receipt holders (the “Share Transfer”).

3.3

C&L provides certain registry services to Telstra ESOP Trustee Pty Limited, a
trustee established by Telstra to administer its employee share ownership
plan (the “ESOP Trustee”).

3.4

PW Australia performs audit services for Telstra under contract with
Telstra’s auditor in Australia, the Auditor General of Australia, and serves
as Telstra’s auditor in connection with its filing with the SEC of registration
statements, forms and reports under the Securities Act of 1933 (the
“Securities Act”) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange
Act”). PW does not serve as the auditor of TIRT or the ESOP Trustee. The
Auditor General serves as auditor of those entities, as well as Telstra.

3.5

C&L will transfer the share registry line of business to a new entity (the
“SRS Entity”) prior to the Merger. The SRS Entity will be owned by the
present partners of C&L but will not be included in the Merged Firm. The
present partners of C&L will play no role with respect to audit services
performed for Telstra. PW partners will retain sole responsibility for those
services.

3.6

C&L presently is pursuing a plan to divest its share registry business within
a reasonable and limited period not to extend beyond the end of Telstra’s
fiscal year on June 30, 1999. Telstra and C&L seek to avoid any
precipitous disruption of service in connection with the divestment,
particularly during a period when the Commonwealth may conduct a
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further offering of Telstra securities.
4. Relevant literature

4.1

4.2

4.3

Auditor Independence Generally
4.1.1

Rule 2-01 of Regulation S-X

4.1.2

Section 600 of the Codification of Financial Reporting Policies
(the “Codification”)

4.1.3

Rule 101 of the AICPA’s Code of Professional Conduct

Share Registry Services
4.2.1

Levitz, Zacks & Ciceric, SEC No-Action Letter, [1994-1995
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 76,925, at 78,666
(Dec. 17, 1992)

4.2.2

Section 602.02.c.ii of the Codification, Example 3

4.2.3

AICPA Interpretation 101-3

4.2.4

AICPA Ethics Ruling 39

4.2.5

Western Mining correspondence

Temporary” or “Emergency” Arrangements under SEC Independence
Requirements
4.3.1

William I. Minoletti & Co., P.C., SEC No-Action Letter, [1984
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77,632 at 78,922
(Mar. 27, 1984).

4.3.2

Adler Blanchard & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [1994-1995
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 76,929, at 78,669
(Mar. 11, 1991).
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4.3.3

Stanton, Magedanz, Edens & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [19851986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 78,114, at
76,552 (June 17, 1985).

4.3.4

Caldwell, Becker, Dervin, Petrick & Co., 1995 SEC No-Act
LEXIS 909 (May 10, 1995).

4.3.5

Section 602.02.c.ii of the Codification, Example 6

4.3.6

Section 602.02.g of the Codification, Example 12

5. Proposed response

5.1

The provision of share registry services by the Merged Firm to Telstra,
TIRT and the ESOP Trustee for a limited period of time not to extend
beyond June 30, 1999 would not impair the Merged Firm’s independence
with respect to audit work performed subsequent to the merger related to
financial statements included in registration statements, forms and reports
filed with the SEC under the Securities Act or the Exchange Act.

6. Supporting rationale

 TIRT and the ESOP Trustee
6.1

The provision of share registry services to TIRT and the ESOP Trustee
would not give rise to any potential for self-review.
6.1.1

Neither TIRT, nor the ESOP Trustee, is an audit client of PW or
C&L or will be an audit client of the Merged Firm. Rather, the
Auditor General serves as the auditor of both entities.

6.1.2

The financial accounts of TIRT and the ESOP Trustee will not be
consolidated with those of Telstra.

6.1.3

The records maintained by C&L in relation to registry services
provided to TIRT and the ESOP Trustee (i) do not form the basis
for the preparation or review of accounting entries or financial
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records of Telstra, (ii) have no bearing on the financial statements
of Telstra, and (iii) are not accounting records.
6.2

The services provided to TIRT and the ESOP Trustee do not involve the
assumption of managerial responsibilities of Telstra, because Telstra does
not manage either entity. Both entities are managed independently of
Telstra. The fiduciary obligations of TIRT and the ESOP Trustee are owed
to trust beneficiaries, not to Telstra. TIRT owes its fiduciary obligations to
Instalment Receipt holders, who possess rights similar to those of
shareholders (e.g., voting rights, rights to distributions). The ESOP Trustee
owes its fiduciary obligations to participants in Telstra’s employee share
ownership plan (prior to the Share Transfer, to participating employees
holding instalment receipts and, thereafter, to employee shareholders to the
extent of payment of the second instalment).

 Telstra
6.3

Potential independence issues relating to Telstra would not arise until early
December, 1998, when TIRT transfers the Telstra shares to the Instalment
Receipt holders. Maintenance of the Telstra share register will be merely a
formality prior to that time, because the register will list only two
shareholders: the Commonwealth and TIRT.

6.4

Independence is not impaired after the Share Transfer, because:
6.4.1

C&L Australia partners are currently pursuing a plan to divest the
share registry practice within a reasonable and limited period not to
extend beyond the end of Telstra’s fiscal year on June 30, 1999. In
this regard, C&L Australia has retained an adviser, prepared an
information memorandum, and initiated contact with a number of
potential purchasers.

6.4.2

No partner of the Merged Firm other than present partners of C&L
Australia will derive any benefit from the provision of share
registry services to Telstra. This is because C&L Australia will
transfer the share registry line of business to the SRS Entity prior
to the Merger. The SRS Entity will be owned by the present
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partners of C&L Australia. Further, the present C&L Australia
partners will be walled off from any audit services performed for
Telstra. Such services will be the sole responsibility of the former
PW partners. Thus, the partners who provide audit services to
Telstra will not derive any benefit from the share registry
engagement. The segregation of audit and share registry partners,
together with the other factors we have outlined, mitigates any
potential threat to independence.
6.4.3

The ASX advises registrars electronically of share transfers arising
from market trades. Such transfers are expected to account for
99.7% of the changes in volume on the Telstra share register. The
ASX also retains independent auditors (KPMG) to review the
reliability and integrity of its electronic settlement system and
share transfers arising from market trades. The audit team (i.e., the
former PW personnel) will rely on the opinion of the Auditor
General, which in turn relies on the opinion of KPMG, with
respect to these transfers.

6.4.4

The SRS Entity will perform data entry with respect to non-market
transfers only, which will account for a de minimis percentage
(0.3%) of the changes in volume on the Telstra share register.

6.4.5

If divestiture has not occurred prior to the Share Transfer, the SRS
Entity will provide share registry services to Telstra for only a
limited period which will not extend beyond June 30, 1999, so that
the divestiture may be completed in an orderly fashion.

6.4.6

The SEC Staff advised C&L Australia to cease providing share
registry services to an audit client, Western Mining Corporation, in
1993. As will be evident from a review of the correspondence in
Western Mining, the facts and circumstances considered there are
clearly distinguishable from those presented in paragraphs 6.3
through 6.4.5. It should be noted further that, C&L Australia had
provided both share registry and audit services to Western Mining
Corporation for an extended period of time, as contrasted with the
situation here where the issue arises only as result of a merger and
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a limited transitional period is contemplated during which the
shareholder registry services practice will be divested.
 The Appearance of Independence
6.5

The Commission has stated that the appearance of independence is to be
judged from the perspective of a reasonable investor, knowing all relevant
facts and circumstances. We believe that the facts and circumstances
described herein mitigate any potential threat to independence, and that a
reasonable investor would not perceive any impairment. In this regard, we
note particularly that the Australian Securities Commission sanctions the
provision of share registry services to audit clients, and that the Bank of
New York, not C&L Australia, serves as Telstra’s transfer agent with
respect to ADRs traded on the New York Stock Exchange. In light of these
and the other mitigating facts and circumstances described herein, we
believe that a reasonable investor would perceive the Merged Firm as
having neither mutual nor conflicting interests with Telstra and as
exercising objective and impartial judgment on all issues brought to its
attention.

7. Alternatives considered and why rejected

7.1

C&L and PW considered continuing both share registry services and audit
services on a long-term basis. The firms rejected this option for a number
of business reasons.

8. If confidential treatment requested, explain why it should be granted

8.1

We request confidential treatment of this matter because (i) C&L’s
discussions with the ISB Staff, (ii) C&L’s plans to divest the share registry
business, and (iii) Telstra’s plans with respect to further securities offerings,
constitute confidential commercial or financial information, the public
disclosure of which could cause harm to C&L and Telstra and interfere
with the orderly divestiture of the share registry business.
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9. Expedited Consideration

9.1

We request expedited consideration of this Request for
Interpretation/Advice. As indicated, the issue will arise when the merger
takes effect in July, 1998. Telstra wishes to be assured as to the Merged
Firm’s independence well in advance of that date. Accordingly, favorable
action is sought by the end of May, 1998.

DC02:0131188.02
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